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THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF LEAD LAWYERS 




Recent developments in multidistrict litigations (MDLs) raise important 
questions about the responsibilities of lead attorneys1 and judges.  
Increasingly, lead attorneys seem to use their control of settlement 
negotiations to enhance their compensation.  In a prior article co-authored 
with Professor Geoffrey P. Miller, I argued that this conduct violates lead 
lawyers’ fiduciary responsibilities.2
Judge Eldon E. Fallon, who presides over the massive Vioxx MDL,
  But judges approve of this behavior 
instead of reining it in. 
3 
found my critique unconvincing.  In an order on common benefit fees and 
costs, he explained why, in his view, the self-enriching actions of the lead 
attorneys in that MDL were appropriate.4  He also criticized a proposal 
Professor Miller and I set out for selecting and compensating lead lawyers 
in MDLs.5  When doing so, he relied on a draft study by Carolyn A. Dubay, 
formerly a researcher at the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), who also found 
our proposal wanting.6
 
*  Roy W. and Eugenia C. McDonald Endowed Chair in Civil Procedure and Co-Director of 
the Center on Lawyers, Civil Justice and the Media, School of Law, University of Texas at 
Austin.  Professor Silver consults with attorneys involved in litigation and assisted lawyers 
with Vioxx-related cases.   
 
 1. In this Article, I use the phrases “lead lawyers” and “lead attorneys” to describe 
lawyers formally appointed to positions of authority in MDLs, and the phrases “disabled 
lawyers” and “disabled attorneys” to describe lawyers denied such appointments.  A third 
category includes lawyers not formally appointed to positions of authority who perform and 
are compensated for common benefit work, i.e., legal services deemed to be of value for all 
plaintiffs with cases in an MDL.  For convenience, I include disabled lawyers who perform 
common benefit work in the lead attorney category.  For descriptions of the positions of 
authority in MDLs, see MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.2 (2004). 
 2. Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing 
Multi-District Litigations:  Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107 (2010). 
 3. Order & Reasons, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 
2010). 
 4. Id. at 3–8, 12–15 & nn.15–16. 
 5. Id. at 3 n.4. 
 6. CAROLYN A. DUBAY, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., TRENDS AND PROBLEMS IN THE 
APPOINTMENT AND COMPENSATION OF COMMON BENEFIT COUNSEL IN COMPLEX MULTI-
DISTRICT LITIGATION:  AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF TEN MEGA MDLS 7–8, 59–62 (July 2010) (on 
file with the Fordham Law Review).  Given the role I played in sparking the Federal Judicial 
Center’s interest in MDLs, I am reminded of Gore Vidal’s observation that “no good deed 
goes unpunished.” See infra Part IV. 
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In this Article, I respond to the criticisms made by Judge Fallon and 
Dubay.  The analysis builds on my work with Professor Miller and also on 
the article in this issue that I co-authored with Professor Lynn A. Baker.7
I.  BACKGROUND ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATIONS 
  I 
encourage readers to become familiar with those writings before tackling 
this one. 
An MDL is created when the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 
(JPML) transfers related cases pending in diverse federal district courts to a 
designated forum for consolidated pretrial motions and discovery.  When 
the cases are ready for trial, the MDL judge is supposed to send them back 
to their original forums.8  Remands are so uncommon, however, that MDLs 
have been compared to “black holes.”9
After the JPML transfers cases to an MDL forum, lawyers who were 
formerly litigating separately must coordinate their efforts.   They must 
establish a governance structure that will divide tasks, assign 
responsibilities, monitor performance, and make decisions.  They must also 
decide whether fees and costs will be shared and, if so, on what terms.   
  Cases sent into MDLs rarely escape 
their grip.  
In theory, lawyers could create governance structures themselves.  In 
practice, MDL judges usually take charge of this task.  They empower a 
small number of lead lawyers to exercise managerial authority on the 
plaintiffs’ side and relegate the rest of the lawyers to passive positions.  I 
use the label “disabled lawyers” to describe lawyers denied lead counsel 
positions because their ability to act for their clients in the MDL is limited. 
Lead attorneys enjoy plenary and, in many respects, exclusive control of 
the litigation.  Although they report to and receive input from disabled 
attorneys, they are independent actors who operate subject to no one’s 
control.  Disabled lawyers cannot tell lead attorneys what to do; nor can 
they fire them for disobedience.  If disabled lawyers dislike the way lead 
lawyers are performing, their only recourse is to complain to the trial judge, 
who, for a variety of reasons, is unlikely to be sympathetic.   
Plaintiffs also have little control of lead lawyers.  Although a lawyer 
must normally follow a client’s lawful marching orders as given, there is no 
evidence that lead attorneys look to their clients for instructions when 
deciding how to handle MDLs.  For example, when, as sometimes happens, 
bellwether trials occur in MDLs, lead lawyers decide which cases will be 
tried (or recommended to the MDL judge as candidates for trial) without 
asking the plaintiffs whether they favor bellwether trials or agree with the 
choice of cases.  The same is true when lead attorneys initiate global 
 
 7. See Lynn A. Baker & Charles Silver, Fiduciaries and Fees:  Preliminary Thoughts, 
79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1833 (2011). 
 8. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006); see infra note 70. 
 9. See, e.g., Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. 
L. REV. 2323, 2330 & n.21 (2008); Brent M. Rosenthal, Toxic Torts and Mass Torts, 63 
SMU L. REV. 845, 851 (2010); Gary Wilson et al., The Future of Products Liability in 
America, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 85, 104 & n.108, 112 (2000). 
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settlement negotiations.  They do not ask plaintiffs for permission to 
negotiate.   
Lead attorneys in MDLs closely resemble lawyers who litigate class 
actions.  Both enjoy considerable independence from the persons they 
represent.  No class member can tell class counsel what to do, not even the 
named plaintiff.10
Judges recognize the similarities between class actions and MDLs.  They 
refer to MDLs as “quasi-class actions,” and they borrow freely from class 
action jurisprudence managing MDLs.
  In practical effect, a lawyer representing a class is an 
independent actor or a trustee, not an agent.  The same is true of lawyers 
assigned to managerial positions in MDLs. 
11  For example, when compensating 
lead attorneys or reimbursing their expenses, judges draw upon 
restitutionary doctrines that evolved in class actions.12  They also take note 
of the size of fee awards in class actions when deciding how much lead 
attorneys in MDLs should be paid.13
II.  ARE LEAD ATTORNEYS FIDUCIARIES? 
 
The fiduciary duty requires an agent to act solely for a principal’s benefit 
when acting on the principal’s behalf.  The duty prohibits an agent from 
using his or her powers to benefit a third party or for personal gain.  
Ordinary attorneys are fiduciaries.  Attorneys who handle class actions are 
fiduciaries too.  There are differences between ordinary attorneys and class 
counsel, of course, an important one being that an ordinary lawyer is an 
agent while an attorney representing a class more closely resembles a 
trustee.  The assertion that both lawyers are fiduciaries has merit, even so, 
because both lawyers must ignore their own interests when representing 
others.  As explained in the article Professor Baker and I co-authored, this 
means that both lawyers may properly enhance their compensation only as a 
side-effect of increasing their entrustors’ recoveries.14
Given that both lawyers who represent individual claimants and lawyers 
who handle class actions are fiduciaries, it would be surprising to discover 
that lead lawyers in MDLs were not.  Yet, insofar as legal doctrine is 
concerned, the matter is uncertain.  Although commentators argue that lead 
attorneys are fiduciaries and should be treated as such, solid authority for 
 
 
 10. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1) advisory committee’s note (“Appointment as class counsel 
means that the primary obligation of counsel is to the class rather than to any individual 
members of it.  The class representatives do not have an unfettered right to ‘fire’ class 
counsel.  In the same vein, the class representatives cannot command class counsel to accept 
or reject a settlement proposal.  To the contrary, class counsel must determine whether 
seeking the court’s approval of a settlement would be in the best interests of the class as a 
whole.”). Class actions brought under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(PSLRA) are an exception to this observation. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4 (2006).  In 
these cases, large investors appointed to lead plaintiff positions exercise real control of class 
counsel. Id. 
 11. See Silver & Miller, supra note 2, at 110 & n.7 (detailing the historical background 
of the “quasi-class action”); id. at 110–11, 114–18. 
 12. Id. at 109–10, 122–30. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Baker & Silver, supra note 7, at 1836–42. 
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the proposition is surprisingly scarce.  The MDL statute does not address 
the matter and the common law is undeveloped.15
Consider the statement of lead lawyers’ responsibilities that appears in 
the Manual for Complex Litigation (the Manual), which requires lead 
attorneys to “act fairly, efficiently, and economically in the interests of all 
parties and parties’ counsel.”
 
16  The decision to recognize disabled lawyers 
and claimants separately makes sense, for the fortunes of both rest in lead 
attorneys’ hands.  Even so, the language used in the Manual falls short of 
stating the fiduciary standard.  The phrase “all parties and parties’ 
counsel”17
Relying on the passage in the Manual discussed above, the Principles of 
the Law of Aggregate Litigation (the Principles), which the American Law 
Institute (ALI) published in 2010, concludes that lead attorneys in MDLs 
are fiduciaries.
 includes the lead attorneys.  The Manual might therefore imply 
that lead attorneys can consider their own interests and can put their own 
interests on par with those of claimants and disabled lawyers.  The fiduciary 
duty requires a lawyer to ignore his or her own interests.  It does not permit 
a lawyer to engage in self-enriching behavior as long as a client is treated 
“fairly.” 
18  However, it does not examine the ambiguity just pointed 
out.  It also later states that “[t]o promote adequate representation, judges 
may . . . enforce fiduciary duties on named parties and their attorneys.”19
Illustration 4 to § 1.05 in the Principles suggests that this implication was 
not intended.  It assumes that “Lawyers I, O, and P [represent hundreds of 
clients with asbestos-related claims],”
  
This seems to imply that it is up to MDL judges to decide whether lead 
attorneys are fiduciaries or not. 
20 that the clients’ cases are 
consolidated in an MDL, and that the MDL judge “appoints Lawyer T, who 
also has cases there, to the position of Lead Counsel.”21  It then states flatly 
that “Lawyer T becomes a fiduciary to all plaintiffs and lawyers in the 
consolidated proceedings and may not use her position to enrich herself at 
their expense.”22
The Principles also recognizes that lead attorneys are fiduciaries of a 
certain kind.  Some fiduciaries are forbidden from helping one beneficiary 
 
 
 15. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407. 
 16. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 1, § 10.22. 
 17. Id. 
 18. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.04 reporter’s notes cmt. a 
(2010) (observing that “[c]lass counsel is a [] fiduciary to a client[, the named plaintiff,] who 
is also a fiduciary [to other class members],” and that “[a] similar relationship obtains 
between lead attorneys and other lawyers in a multidistrict litigation”).  I was an Associate 
Reporter on the Principles and bore primary responsibility for Chapter One.  However, like 
other American Law Institute (ALI) projects, the Principles was a collaborative undertaking.  
The entire project, including Chapter One, benefited enormously from comments and 
contributions made by all the Reporters and by other members of the ALI, including 
Professor Howard M. Erichson, the organizer of this Symposium. 
 19. Id. § 1.05(c)(3) (emphasis added). 
 20. Id. § 1.05 illus. 2, 4. 
 21. Id. § 1.05 illus. 4. 
 22. Id. 
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at the expense of another.  Normally, lawyers fall into this group.  By 
subordinating one client’s interests to another’s without informed consent, a 
lawyer would act disloyally.  Other fiduciaries are allowed to make 
tradeoffs.  Trustees are the exemplars of this group.  A trustee may use 
entrusted assets to send one beneficiary to college even though less money 
will be available to help another beneficiary as a result.  When making 
tradeoffs among beneficiaries, trustees need only be reasonable and fair.  
The Principles suggests that lead attorneys resemble trustees more than 
lawyers or other agents.  Their responsibility is to “pursu[e] the good of 
all,” which, if need be, they may do by making tradeoffs that are reasonably 
“likely to maximize the value of all claims in the group.”23
In one respect, then, the Principles is good authority for the position I 
espouse.  It states unequivocally that lead attorneys are fiduciaries.  In 
another respect, though, the Principles has no authority at all.  The ALI can 
identify what its members regard as good practices and doctrines, but the 
organization has no power to make law.  Moreover, on the point at issue, 
the Reporters’ Notes to § 1.05 cite no statutory or common law authority.  
In this respect, the Principles resembles the Manual, which cites no 
authority either.  Both volumes thus show plainly that the law governing 
lead lawyers’ responsibilities is immature. 
 
Given the dearth of authority directly on point, judges may take guidance 
from other bodies of law.  If they do, they will quickly conclude that lead 
attorneys are fiduciaries.  Mass tort lawyers are fiduciaries,24 and so are 
lawyers who represent plaintiff classes.25
Lead lawyers are certainly fiduciaries to their signed clients.  In an MDL, 
therefore, the question is not whether lead attorneys are fiduciaries—they 
are—but to whom their responsibilities extend.  In particular, it is important 
to know whether they must treat non-client claimants as well as they treat 
their clients.  The basis for an affirmative answer is clear.  To the extent that 
lead attorneys displace disabled lawyers, they assume disabled lawyers’ 
duties, including the fiduciary duty to refrain from exploiting clients.  
  These examples are the most 
analogous to lead counsel.   
 
 23. Id. § 1.05 cmt. f.  The argument that lead attorneys resemble trustees more than 
agents draws support from several facts, including the inability of entrustors to select lead 
attorneys, fire them, or control them, and the absence of market mechanisms that ordinarily 
encourage agents to perform well. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties, in 2 THE NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 127–28 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
 24. See, e.g., Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 81 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that “the 
Defendants,” who represented a group of plaintiffs with asbestos claims, “were acting as the 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys,” and that “[i]t is well-settled law, regardless of jurisdiction, that 
attorneys owe their clients a fiduciary duty” (citing Akron Bar Ass’n v. Williams, 819 
N.E.2d 677, 680 (Ohio 2004)). 
 25. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 1, § 21.12 (“[A]n attorney 
acting on behalf of a putative class must act in the best interests of the class as a whole.” 
(citing FED. R. CIV. P 23(g)(2)(A) advisory’s committee note; 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & 
W WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 38.4, at 38-7 (3d ed. 2002)); In re Pharm. 
Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 588 F.3d 24, 36 n.12 (1st Cir. 2009) (citations 
omitted) (“Class counsel are fiduciaries to the class.”). 
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Otherwise, MDL procedures would alter plaintiffs’ substantive rights by 
allowing lead attorneys to take advantage of them.   
First principles also support the conclusion that lead attorneys are 
fiduciaries.  In contractual principal-agent relationships, a fiduciary duty is 
implied when an agent armed with “open-ended management power” can 
help a principal or act to a principal’s detriment.26  The fiduciary duty 
protects the principal from exploitation by allowing the principal to demand 
ex post judicial review of the agent’s behavior.27  In MDLs, lead attorneys 
possess immense power and discretion.  Consequently, non-client claimants 
are at risk of being exploited and require the protection the fiduciary duty 
provides.  The ALI’s Principles takes this position.  Section 1.05 
encourages judges to ensure passive parties are adequately represented in all 
aggregate proceedings and it identifies the fiduciary duty as a tool to further 
this goal.28
 To this point, the discussion of lead attorneys’ responsibilities has 
focused on non-client claimants whose retained lawyers are disabled.  
Because disabled lawyers also have interests at stake in MDLs, one must 
also ask whether lead lawyers have fiduciary responsibilities to them.  That 
disabled lawyers are at risk of being exploited is clear.  In the Vioxx MDL, 
the lead attorneys asked for $388 million in common benefit fees, 8% of the 
$4.85 billion recovery.
 
29  This eye-popping sum was to come from the 
pockets of disabled lawyers, whose contractual fees would be cut so that 
lead attorneys could be paid.  The possibility of over-reaching is clear.  
First, Judge Fallon awarded $73 million less than the lead attorneys 
requested, showing that, in his opinion, they over-valued their services by 
almost 20 percent.30  Second, the lead attorneys may have used their control 
of settlement negotiations to prevent disabled lawyers from complaining.  
The settlement agreement they negotiated required all disabled lawyers to 
waive their objections to the common benefit fee tax as a condition for 
enrolling clients.31
The fiduciary duty can protect disabled lawyers while still permitting 
lead attorneys’ to do their jobs.  Although a fiduciary duty would prevent 
lead attorneys from using their control of settlement negotiations to enrich 
themselves at disabled lawyers’ expense, it would leave them completely 
free to do so by increasing claimants’ recoveries.  This is what they are 
supposed to use their powers to do.  The duty would also allow lead 
  Because disabled lawyers had to do what their clients 
wanted, those whose clients were better off settling were forced to submit.  
Plainly, the lead attorneys may have strategized to the disabled lawyers’ 
disadvantage. 
 
 26. Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 215. 
 27. Id. 
 28. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 18, § 1.05(b), (c)(3). 
 29. See Order & Reasons, supra note 3, at 9. 
 30. Id. at 37. 
 31. See Master Settlement Agreement § 1.2.4, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 
1657 (E.D. La. Nov. 9, 2007) (requiring waiver of objections). 
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attorneys to apply to the MDL court for common benefit compensation, just 
as lawyers do in successful class actions.   
III.  THE LEAD ATTORNEYS’ ACTIONS IN THE VIOXX MDL 
The business model for MDLs and similar state court consolidations 
constantly evolves.  Techniques that are completely unprecedented first 
emerge as experiments by judges and lead attorneys.  Innovations that 
further the central players’ interests are quickly adopted in other 
proceedings, even if the practices seem dubious.  Because appellate courts 
rarely interfere with trial judges’ management of MDLs, questionable 
practices can persist for years.32
Consider practices relating to common benefit fees and expenses.  Very 
little authority addresses these practices, and almost none of it comes from 
appellate courts.  Although MDL judges force disabled lawyers to cover 
lead lawyers’ fees and expenses, the legal basis for these coercive transfers 
is unclear.
 
33  The MDL statute says nothing about compensation.  Federal 
judges’ inherent power to manage their dockets, which empowers them to 
fine lawyers who act improperly, provides no basis for orders that force 
innocent lawyers to give up millions of dollars.  The strongest justification 
is provided by the restitutionary theory that supports fee awards in class 
actions, but that theory does not work in MDLs, for reasons Professor 
Miller and I explained.34
Despite these shortcomings and the enormity of the stakes, appellate 
courts have provided little guidance.  When Judge Fallon awarded $315 
million in common benefit fees in Vioxx, the only Fifth Circuit authority he 
could cite was a 1977 case, In re Air Crash Disaster.
 
35  There, the trial 
judge ordered two lawyers to pay the lead attorneys $270,000 after the 
lawyers refused the trial judge’s offer to share the workload in the MDL.36  
In a confusing and haphazardly reasoned opinion that provides little 
authority for current practices, the Fifth Circuit affirmed.37
Recognizing that the legal basis for common benefit fee and cost awards 
is questionable, MDL judges and lead attorneys have sought to lend these 
forced transfers a consensual veneer.
 
38  They first attempted to do so by 
promulgating form contracts for disabled lawyers to sign.39
 
 32. On the rarity of appellate review of MDL judges’ management decisions, see 
Andrew S. Pollis, The Need for Non-Discretionary Interlocutory Appellate Review in 
Multidistrict Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643, 1645 (2011) (observing that “[t]he MDL 
system creates [a] sort of ‘kingly power’ in trial judges” and that “there is no appellate 
jurisdiction over most interlocutory MDL orders”). 
  The contracts 
 33. Silver & Miller, supra note 2, at 126–35 & nn.85–89 (discussing the practice and 
citing various cases where such orders were issued). 
 34. Id. at 109, 121–30. 
 35. 549 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 36. See id. at 1008, 1010–11. 
 37. Id. at 1021. 
 38. Silver & Miller, supra note 2, at 135. 
 39. Id. at 134–35. 
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were shams, however, because disabled lawyers’ consent was coerced.40  
They could not bargain over terms, decide which lead lawyers to employ, or 
refuse to sign without penalty.41  The form contracts were offers disabled 
lawyers could not refuse.42
The form contracts did not even lock in the price of common benefit 
work for the disabled lawyers who signed them.  In the Guidant MDL, the 
court promulgated form agreements setting the price of common benefit 
work at 4% of the gross monetary recovery.
 
43  The same judge later set 
aside 18.5% of the $240 million recovery for the lead attorneys.44  In Vioxx, 
the contracts specified a 2% levy for fees.45  The lead attorneys nonetheless 
demanded 8% of the $4.85 billion settlement and eventually received 6.5% 
from the court.46
In my opinion, the actions that led to the fee increases in Guidant and 
Vioxx were opportunistic.  In both MDLs, the lead attorneys used their 
control of settlement negotiations to increase the amount of money 
available for common benefit fees and to prevent disabled lawyers from 
complaining.  Yet, in neither MDL were the lead attorneys’ actions 
condemned.  To the contrary, they were reviewed and approved.  Because 
Vioxx presents the cleaner example and also offers Judge Fallon’s responses 
to my complaints, I focus on it here. 
 
As explained, Judge Fallon initially entered an order promulgating fee 
and cost sharing contracts that set common benefit fees at 2% of the gross 
recovery.47  Provisions in the Vioxx Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) 
later (1) expressly superseded that order, (2) raised the cap on common 
benefit fees to 8%, (3) required that the entire 8% be placed in escrow, (4) 
made disabled lawyers (rather than claimants) liable for the entire amount, 
and (5) required disabled lawyers and their clients to waive any and all 
objections to the MSA as a condition for enrolling in the settlement.48
 
 40. See id. at 135. 
 
 41. See id. 
 42. This is, of course, a reference to the famous line from The Godfather. THE 
GODFATHER (Paramount Pictures 1972) ("I'm gonna make him an offer he can't refuse.").  
For a thorough study of the many lessons The Godfather has for aggregate litigation, see 
Richard A. Nagareda, Closure in Damage Class Settlement:  The Godfather Guide to Opt-
Out Rights, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141. 
 43. Pretrial Order No. 6 at 3–4, In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. 
Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB) (D. Minn. Feb. 15, 2006). 
 44. In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-
1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 451076, at *1 (D. Minn. Feb. 15, 2008).  The order set aside 
$10 million in cost reimbursements, only $3.5 million of which was slated to cover the 
managerial attorneys’ out-of-pocket expenses. Id. 
 45. See Order & Reasons, supra note 3, at 5. 
 46. See id. at 9, 36–37. 
 47. Pretrial Order No. 19 at 3, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. 
Aug. 4, 2005) (creating a “full participation option” for disabled lawyers who signed form 
contracts within ninety days and setting common benefit compensation at 2% for fees and 
1% for costs).  To keep the discussion simple, I ignore costs. 
 48. Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 30, §§ 9.2.1, 9.2.3 (raising the limit on 
common benefit fees, overriding Pretrial Order 19, and identifying lawyers’ contingent fees 
as the source of funding); id. § 9.2.2 (authorizing an award of common benefit expenses); id. 
§ 1.2.4 (requiring waiver of objections). 
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Why these provisions appeared in the MSA is a mystery.  Judge Fallon’s 
order setting the 2% cap did not contain language allowing lawyers or 
parties to override it by agreement.  Therefore, the proper way to modify 
the order was to ask Judge Fallon to revise it.  That approach had a 
downside, however.  Had the lead lawyers filed a motion requesting an 
increase in common benefit fees, disabled lawyers would have been entitled 
to contest it, to make an opposing evidentiary presentation, and, had Judge 
Fallon ruled against them, to appeal.  Had the lead attorneys filed a motion 
to raise the common benefit fee after the MSA was announced, they would 
also have had no leverage over the disabled lawyers or their clients, their 
services no longer being required. 
The presence of fee-related provisions in the MSA also seems odd for 
another reason:  no one—not even the lead lawyers’ own signed clients—
authorized or instructed the lead attorneys to bargain with the defendant 
over common benefit fees.  The order appointing the plaintiffs’ steering 
committee authorized it to pursue “settlement options pertaining to any 
claim or portion thereof.”49  This seems clearly to have meant claims the 
plaintiffs had against the defendant, not claims the plaintiffs or their 
lawyers had against each other.50
To appreciate the oddity of this decision, imagine that a lawyer 
representing a single plaintiff in a personal injury case negotiated a 
settlement that overrode the existing contingent fee agreement, increased 
the lawyer’s fee by 400%, and made the client waive any and all objections 
to the lawyer’s actions as a condition for getting a payment.  Imagine 
further that the lawyer did all this without telling the client in advance, 
obtaining the client’s consent, or explaining the conflict of interests.  The 
breach of the lawyer’s fiduciary duty, the lawyer’s lack of authority, and the 
impropriety of negotiating fees with the defendant would all be self-evident.  
I believe one should reach the same conclusions when evaluating the 
behavior of the lead attorneys who negotiated the Vioxx MSA. 
  Common benefit fees fall into the latter 
category.  Nor were negotiations over common benefit fees needed to 
resolve any plaintiff’s claim.  The lead attorneys seem to me simply to have 
chosen to make a matter of interest solely to plaintiffs and their lawyers the 
subject of settlement negotiations with the defendant. 
The only explanation I can think of for the decision to negotiate common 
benefit fees with the defendant is that the lead attorneys saw an opportunity 
 
 49. Pretrial Order No. 6 at 3, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La., 
Apr. 8, 2005). 
 50. Further evidence of the speed with which MDL practices evolve can be found in an 
order entered in the state court consolidation of Kugel Mesh cases in Rhode Island. Assented 
to Assessment Order, In re All Individual Kugel Mesh Cases, No:  PC-2008-9999 (R.I. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 11, 2009).  The order expressly authorizes the lead attorneys to negotiate a 
“payment from [the] defendants . . . separate from and in addition to any payment made to 
any plaintiff, which separate payment(s) is intended to be for common benefit attorneys[’] 
fees and expenses.” Id. at 2.  This authorization denies claimants adequate representation by 
building a strong conflict into their relationship with the lead attorneys.  For present 
purposes, though, the important point is that someone recognized that lead attorneys lack 
authority to negotiate common benefit fees with defendants and moved to correct the 
problem by including the identified language in the appointment order. 
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to prevent disabled lawyers from objecting.  As mentioned, section 1.2.4 of 
the Vioxx MSA provided that any lawyer who enrolled even a single client 
in the settlement was “deemed to have agreed to be bound by all of the 
terms and conditions” in the MSA, including the provisions relating to 
common benefit fees.51
Like the form contracts previously promulgated by the court, the Vioxx 
MSA seems to me to have been designed to foster the false impression that 
disabled lawyers freely consented to the 400% common benefit fee 
increase.  The lead attorneys sought to capitalize on this impression when 
they applied for $388 million (8% of the gross recovery) in common benefit 
fees.  The demand was reasonable, they argued, because instead of “us[ing] 
the MDL work-product, pay[ing] the [2%] assessment, and tak[ing] the 
chance of trying their case to verdict before a jury,”
  Because the settlement was a good deal for many 
claimants, disabled lawyers were whipsawed.  The law in all jurisdictions 
required them to communicate the settlement offer to their clients, to advise 
all clients for whom the offer was a good deal to accept it, and to enroll any 
client who wished to participate.  Yet, to enroll even one client, a disabled 
lawyer had to waive any and all complaints he or she personally had 
relating to common benefit fees.  To protect themselves, disabled lawyers 
would have had to violate their duties to their clients.  As far as I know, 
none did. 
52 all but a few 
claimants “voluntarily chose to participate in the Settlement Agreement 
with Merck, which agreement clearly denotes the 8% assessment.”53  
Professor Miller and I rated this argument “laughable.”54
Judge Fallon knew our position, but he sided with the lead attorneys 
anyway.
  The fiduciary 
duty requires lawyers to refrain from using their powers to enrich 
themselves.  It does not recognize the possibility that a client might reject a 
settlement offer as a reason for allowing a lawyer to act opportunistically 
when negotiating on a client’s behalf.  The law could not be otherwise.  
Clients can always reject settlement offers.  A contrary rule would therefore 
allow plaintiffs’ attorneys to engage in self-enriching behavior in all 
settlement negotiations. 
55
The [2%] fee assessment agreements were reasonable and appropriate to 
create a fund to compensate common benefit attorneys for the 
consolidated MDL discovery work that was contemplated at that early 
stage of the litigation.  When circumstances changed as a result of the 
 
 
 51. Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 30, § 1.2.4. 
 52. Plaintiffs’ Liaison Counsel’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Award of 
Plaintiffs’ Common Benefit Counsel Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses at 48, In re 
Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 2009). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Silver & Miller, supra note 2, at 135. 
 55. Judge Eldon E. Fallon also attacked us ad hominem. See Order & Reasons, supra 
note 3, at 15 n.16 (noting that Professors Silver and Miller were “‘paid consultants to a group 
of attorneys in the Vioxx MDL who have questioned or challenged aspects of the settlement, 
including the fee assessment’” (quoting Silver & Miller, supra note 2, at 107 n.*)).  More 
evidence that no good deed goes unpunished. 
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extensive discovery, numerous trials, and through negotiation and 
implementation of a global opt-in settlement, it became necessary to 
reevaluate the reasonable compensation for the common benefit attorneys 
who accomplished those tasks.  The claimants and their attorneys 
acknowledged those changed circumstances when they accepted the terms 
of the Settlement Agreement which supplanted the [Pretrial Order (PTO)] 
19 assessments. Settlement Agreement § 9.2.1.  Moreover, the Court’s 
equitable and managerial authority and duty to award fair common benefit 
fees or to adjust contingent fees exists independent of contractual 
agreement, and the Court’s authority to do justice by reducing attorneys’ 
fees necessarily encompasses the corollary authority to increase fees 
where appropriate.56
This passage is rife with mistakes. 
 
First, if the 2% agreements were real contracts rather than shams, then 
the fact (assuming it is one) that the lead attorneys did more work than they 
expected was simply their bad luck.  All contingent percentage fee 
agreements assign the lawyer the risk associated with effort.  Having set the 
fee, the lawyer must live with it, even when the workload is unexpectedly 
great.57
Second, Professor Miller and I never denied that the lead attorneys could 
properly have asked Judge Fallon for a raise.  To the contrary, we expressly 
stated that “[t]o get around the agreements, . . . the lead attorneys might 
have sought orders increasing the amounts set aside for common benefit 
compensation,”
  The lead attorneys were stuck with the fees their signed clients 
agreed to pay.  Why they were not also stuck with the fees they put in the 
2% agreements Judge Fallon did not say. 
58 and we cited the Bextra MDL as an instance in which the 
lead lawyers employed this straightforward approach.59
Third, Judge Fallon’s inference that claimants and disabled lawyers 
acknowledged the merit of the lead attorneys’ demand for a raise is wholly 
unwarranted.  Insofar as the claimants were concerned, the decision to 
enroll showed only that they preferred settling to continuing to fight.  The 
common benefit fee provisions were irrelevant to them because the money 
came out of their lawyers’ pockets, not theirs.  Insofar as the disabled 
  Our complaint was 
that the lead attorneys abused their control of the settlement negotiations.  
Judge Fallon’s observation that he would have given them a raise, had they 
asked, has no bearing on this point. 
 
 56. Order & Reasons, supra note 3, at 14 n.15 (citing In re Guidant Corp. Implantable 
Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174, at *11–
12 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008)). 
 57. A lawyer can ask a client to renegotiate, and the lead attorneys could have 
renegotiated the 2% agreements with the disabled lawyers.  They didn’t, presumably because 
they knew that many, most, or all of the disabled lawyers would refuse to pay them more.  
The lead attorneys’ failure to negotiate directly with disabled lawyers is another indication 
that the disabled lawyers’ “consent” to the fee increase was coerced.  
 58. Silver & Miller, supra note 2, at 132 (citing Pretrial Order No. 8A:  Amendment to 
Order Establishing Common Benefit Fund at 4, In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales 
Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1699 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 2008)). 
 59. See Pretrial Order No. 8A, supra note 58; Silver & Miller, supra note 2, at 132 & 
n.86. 
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lawyers were concerned, one can infer nothing at all.  The decision to settle 
was the claimants’, not theirs.  Disabled lawyers were legally bound to do 
what their clients wanted, regardless of their personal wishes. 
To see the flaw in Judge Fallon’s reasoning, one need only recognize its 
potential to legitimate any provision the lead attorneys might have put into 
the MSA.  They might have commandeered 100% of disabled lawyers’ 
fees.  They might have required enrollees to send letters recommending 
them for the Nobel Peace Prize.  According to Judge Fallon’s logic, a 
claimant’s desire for a settlement check would legitimate these provisions 
and others even more egregious.  It cannot be right to allow lead attorneys 
to use the threat to withhold settlement checks to gain unlimited leverage 
over claimants and disabled lawyers. 
The basic point is simple.  As Judge Fallon recognized and as Professor 
Miller and I pointed out, the lead attorneys could properly have obtained a 
fee increase by requesting one from the court.  Consequently, they need not 
have included any provisions relating to the amount of common benefit fees 
in the MSA.  But they did.  A possible explanation, which seems right to 
me, is that they used their control of the settlement negotiations to pre-empt 
the opposition they expected disabled lawyers to mount. 
By putting their fees on the table when bargaining with the defendant, the 
lead attorneys may have jeopardized the claimants’ interests too.  Knowing 
that the lead attorneys wanted its help, Merck would rationally have sought 
to exchange cooperation on fees for concessions on other relief.  Defendants 
have often used this tactic to buy off attorneys in class actions.  Merck 
would have been foolish not to have employed it. 
In an ordinary personal injury representation, a contingent fee lawyer’s 
sole object when bargaining with a defendant is to obtain the most money 
possible for the client.  By maximizing the client’s recovery, the lawyer 
also maximizes the fee.  The harmony of interest between the lawyer and 
the client is substantial, and the defendant has no control of the lawyer’s 
compensation.  Lead attorneys should maintain the same laser-like focus 
when bargaining for global resolutions in MDLs.  No one needs to know 
how much a defendant thinks a group of lead attorneys should be paid.  (A 
candid defendant would say “nothing,” anyway.)  Injecting fees into the 
discussion also creates an enormous conflict between claimants and their 
representatives, saddling claimants with inadequate representation and 
denying them due process of law.  Lead attorneys should use settlement 
negotiations solely to maximize the value of plaintiffs’ claims.  They should 
resolve the size of common benefit fees by means of real agreements with 
other plaintiffs’ attorneys or by seeking fee awards from MDL judges, who 
can set them after holding evidentiary hearings in orders subject to appellate 
review.60
 
 60. In Silver and Miller, supra note 
 
2, at 160–69, I argue for a fee setting mechanism 
similar to those set out in the PSLRA.  The sentence in the text is not meant to contradict that 
recommendation. 
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IV.  DUBAY’S CRITIQUE 
When I began to study judicial management practices in MDLs, I was 
struck by the scarcity of data.  I wanted to know basic facts, such as which 
lawyers were appointed to lead positions, how many signed clients they 
had, how much they requested in common benefit fees, and how much they 
received.  Neither the JPML nor any other public body collected this 
information.  Settlement administrators had some of it, but they would not 
share.  I therefore decided to focus on the three recent MDLs—Guidant, 
Vioxx, and Zyprexa—that were the source of the emerging quasi-class 
action approach to MDL management and to learn about them from 
published opinions and orders, newspaper stories, academic writings, and 
similar materials. 
Before abandoning my search for data, I contacted Thomas Willging, a 
researcher at the FJC who did empirical studies of mass torts lawsuits, class 
actions, and attorneys’ fees.  I had long admired his work and had relied on 
it many times.  Willging, who has since retired, told me the FJC had no data 
on MDLs.  I encouraged him to make them the focus of a future FJC study. 
Within months, the seed sprouted.  In October 2008, Willging let me 
know that the FJC planned to look at attorney fee awards in selected MDLs.  
Thereafter, the tree quickly bore fruit.  Preliminary drafts of studies 
appeared in remarkably short order, including a paper Carolyn Dubay 
presented at the 2010 Conference on Empirical Legal Studies.61
I do not know how Judge Fallon came to have a copy of Dubay’s report 
before it was published, but I am not surprised that he did.  Because federal 
judges take FJC studies seriously, the network of persons interested in 
MDLs distributed Dubay’s report far and wide.  Because Dubay also 
disagreed with Professor Miller and me on certain points, it was natural for 
Judge Fallon to rely on her work when criticizing us.
  These 
studies have great potential to lift the veil that has long hidden the internal 
workings of MDLs from view. 
62
In most respects, Dubay is on the same page with Professor Miller and 
me.  We focused on products liability MDLs, so does Dubay.  We studied 
Guidant, Vioxx, and Zyprexa; she examined those MDLs plus seven more.  
She identified three issues as “critical” ones for the next edition of the 
Manual to address: 
  Unfortunately, 
because Judge Fallon used her draft report as he did, to respond to him I 
must criticize Dubay in print.  That seems harsh, given that her report is just 
a draft.  I hope Dubay will forgive me for critiquing her preliminary 
thoughts. 
First, as to the appointment of common benefit counsel, guidance should 
be developed for district courts on whether attorneys without cases 
 
 61. See DUBAY, supra note 6; see also Margaret S. Williams & Tracey E. George, Who 
Will Manage Complex Civil Litigation?  The Decision To Transfer and Consolidate 
Multidistrict Litigation, presented at 5th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633703. 
 62. Order & Reasons, supra note 3, at 3 n.4. 
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pending in the MDL may serve as common benefit attorneys.  Second, as 
to the compensation of common benefit counsel, guidance on the use of 
common benefit compensation committees is needed in light of potential 
conflict of interest issues that have arisen in existing MDLs.  Third, as to 
the determination of proper assessment rates for common benefit fee 
awards, guidance is needed on whether and in what circumstances 
differing assessment rates are fair and appropriate.63
Professor Miller and I addressed all three subjects at length.  Like us, 
Dubay also emphasized the “lack of uniformity and transparency” that is 
characteristic of MDLs, noting that “[d]ecisions are rarely published, rarely 
appealed, and oftentimes records relating to fees are filed under seal.”
 
64
However, when it comes to policy recommendations, Dubay’s object 
differs from ours.  She wants to make MDLs work better for judges, while 
also making them more transparent and uniform.  Because she was an 
employee of the FJC, her desire to please judges is understandable.  
Although Professor Miller and I recognize the judiciary’s legitimate interest 
in avoiding duplication, our object is to improve the quality of the 
representation claimants receive within the context of court-ordered 
aggregation.  We also want to restore judicial neutrality and to ensure that 
MDL procedures are lawful.  Because we are less concerned than Dubay 
about pleasing judges, judges are likely to find her recommendations more 
palatable than ours. 
 
The passage below reflects this difference in philosophy.  In it, Dubay 
criticizes the proposal Professor Miller and I offered, which would give 
control of MDLs to plaintiffs’ lawyers with valuable inventories of cases.  
Those lawyers would then hire other attorneys to perform common benefit 
work, the cost of which would be divided among all lawyers with cases in 
an MDL in proportion to their clients’ recoveries.  The controlling lawyers 
would thus pay for common benefit work directly, would pay more than 
disabled attorneys, and would bear the full risk of loss if the cases were 
dismissed.  They would therefore benefit by hiring lawyers capable of 
performing common benefit work at the best combination of quality and 
price.  When it comes to managing plaintiffs’ affairs, judges would have 
about the same level of involvement in MDLs as they do in securities class 
actions brought under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995.65
Dubay disagrees with us over the advisability of putting lawyers with 
valuable inventories of cases in charge.  She argues that 
 
[h]aving a large stake in [an] MDL does not guarantee good 
communication skills, the effective use of attorney time, or even the best 
lawyering.  Instead, the role of the MDL judge demands the ability to 
effective[ly] coordinate not only the many cases within the MDL, but 
state cases as well.  Moreover, the most experienced and effective 
 
 63. DUBAY, supra note 6, at 6. 
 64. Id. at 13. 
 65. Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.); see supra note 10. 
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attorney may have few cases in the MDL, or may represent claimants with 
only economic injuries.  As a zealous advocate, an effective plaintiff’s 
lawyer may have vigorously opposed consolidation in the MDL, or taken 
advantage of opportunities presented in parallel state court proceedings 
beyond the control of the MDL court and its orders.66
The first and third sentences in this passage reflect the influence of the 
“nirvana fallacy,” the idea that a proposal must be rejected unless it is 
perfect.  The right question is not whether a proposal “guarantees” that 
claimants will receive loyal, high quality representation (judicial control 
does not guarantee this either), but whether it makes this result more likely 
and does so at acceptable cost.  Because our proposal takes advantage of 
markets (which tend to direct cases to good attorneys) and incentives 
(which encourage lawyers with large inventories to represent clients well), 
we think it deserves a try. 
 
The second and fourth sentences reflect Dubay’s focus on “the role of the 
MDL judge.”  She dislikes our proposal because, instead of allowing MDL 
judges to pick lawyers who can be relied on to help effectuate judges’ 
objectives, it might give control to troublemakers who dislike forced 
consolidation and actively seek to circumvent it.  Dubay never sees the 
choice of cooperative lawyers as a difficulty, even though due process 
problems arise when lawyers whose loyalties run to judges first and 
claimants second gain control of MDLs.  Her desire to make MDLs work 
better for judges also blinds her to the corrosive impact that involvement in 
plaintiffs’ affairs has on judges’ neutrality.  The loss of neutrality does not 
bother MDL judges, whose desire for global resolutions causes them to 
want as much control of plaintiffs’ lawyers as they can get.  Consequently, 
it also does not bother Dubay. 
When awarding common benefit fees in Vioxx, Judge Fallon need not 
have sided with Dubay or with us.  He chose the lead attorneys and set their 
compensation terms long before our article appeared.  Even so, he discussed 
our proposal in dicta and, not surprisingly, he sided with Dubay. 
Having a large number of cases in the MDL often indicates skill at 
advertising, but does not guarantee the best lawyering or even the 
selection of those best suited to handle the matter in a cooperative 
endeavor which is crucial for MDL proceedings. . . . [T]he efficient and 
successful resolution of an MDL is dependent on coordination and 
cooperation of lead counsel for all sides. . . . In an MDL setting where 
there can be a thousand plaintiffs’ attorneys it not only takes a good 
lawyer to qualify for lead or liaison counsel but one who has the 
diplomatic skills to coordinate the efforts of a diverse group.  Selecting 
lead and liaison counsel by a neutral party such as an MDL judge may not 
be the best method but as between it and the selection by other counsel it 
is the better way.  Moreover, the selection of lead counsel by their fellow 
attorneys would involve intrigue and side agreements which would make 
Macbeth appear to be a juvenile manipulator.  Frequently, 
recommendations by attorneys for positions on leadership committees are 
 
 66. DUBAY, supra note 6, at 59. 
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governed more on friendship, past commitments and future hopes than on 
current issues.67
This passage is interesting for many reasons.  First, it reflects the 
unjustified hostility many judges have toward lawyers who advertise.  
Advertising educates people about their rights, makes it easier for them to 
find representation, facilitates competition, and enhances the public’s 
opinion of lawyers.  It works for lawyers the same way it works for other 
professionals and service providers, such as doctors, dentists, pharmacists, 
and hospitals, all of which advertise extensively.  Judges should neither 
complain about it nor treat lawyers who advertise as second-class attorneys. 
 
Second, when discussing the characteristics of lead attorneys that are 
“crucial for MDL proceedings,”68 Judge Fallon means crucial for judges 
who want global settlements, not for claimants who want to maximize their 
recoveries.  His desire for “cooperative” lawyers with “diplomatic skills” 
who will contribute to “the efficient and successful resolution of an MDL” 
reflects his immersion in a culture that glorifies settlements and deplores 
trials.69  Judge Fallon implicitly dismisses the possibility that what 
plaintiffs need most is a team of aggressive lawyers who will get their cases 
ready for trial in the shortest possible time.  Yet, this is what the MDL 
statute anticipates,70 and it is also what due process requires.  As the 
Supreme Court observed in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, a plaintiff 
who cannot threaten a defendant with a loss at trial cannot obtain fair value 
for a claim in settlement.71  The lawyers in charge of an MDL should be 
strongly motivated to get plaintiffs’ cases ready for trial.72
Third, Judge Fallon’s concern about intrigues, side agreements, and other 
machinations involving lawyers competing for lead positions undoubtedly 




 67. Order & Reasons, supra note 
  What he fails 
3, at 3 n.4. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. (emphasis added). 
 70. The Multidistrict Litigation Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006), authorizes transfers for 
“consolidated pretrial proceedings” and provides that each transferred action “shall be 
remanded . . . to the district from which it was transferred” when pretrial proceedings are 
concluded. See also Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 
(1998) (holding that the MDL court had to remand cases when pretrial proceedings were 
complete and could not preside over the trial of a transferred case). 
 71. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997) (observing that 
“permitting class designation despite the impossibility of litigation” would deny class 
members adequate representation because, when bargaining for settlement, “class 
counsel . . . would be disarmed”). 
 72. Judge Fallon might respond to the statements in this paragraph by pointing out that 
he presided over a series of bellwether trials in the Vioxx MDL.  Bellwether trials can be 
helpful sources of information, but they are no substitute for a realistic threat to remand all 
cases consolidated in an MDL for trials in their original forums.  A plausible argument can 
be made that MDL judges should set firm deadlines by which pretrial preparations must be 
completed so that cases can be remanded, and otherwise leave parties to handle settlement 
negotiations as they wish.  Negotiations would then occur in the shadows of predicted trial 
results, as they should. 
 73. Dubay describes instances in which lawyers vying for lead positions formed or were 
excluded from coalitions competing for control. DUBAY, supra note 6, at 31. 
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to notice or mention is that judges encourage these behaviors by making 
lead counsel positions profit centers.  In context, the omission is 
remarkable.  Judge Fallon failed to recognize the connection between 
existing MDL management procedures and unseemly competition for lead 
counsel positions when writing an order that awarded a group of lead 
attorneys $315 million. 
He may see the connection now.  After the Vioxx Fee Allocation 
Committee (FAC) submitted its final recommendation for dividing the $315 
million fund among attorneys who performed common benefit work, 
dissatisfied lawyers submitted a boatload of objections.74  They complained 
that the lead attorneys, who staffed the FAC, rewarded themselves far too 
lavishly;75 that the FAC’s scoring system was arbitrary, skewed in favor of 
the lead attorneys, and opaque;76 that the FAC compensated some lawyers 
at rates exceeding $2000 an hour while basing other lawyers’ awards on 
hourly rates below $25;77 that the FAC punished certain lawyers who 
objected to its preliminary recommendations by cutting their payments; and 
that certain lead attorneys exceeded their powers by disbursing fee money 
without formal authorization from the court.78
No less apparent is the fact that current arrangements make lead counsel 
positions extraordinarily profitable.  The FAC’s proposed allocation would 
give the three law firms that supplied the lead and liaison counsel $111 
million.
  I do not know whether these 
complaints are valid, but the conflicts and the potential for abuse that exist 
when lead lawyers set their own compensation could not be more apparent.   
79
 
 74. Many disgruntled lawyers filed objections to the Fee Allocation Committee’s (FAC) 
proposed allocation.  For brief accounts and links to some of the complaints, see David 
Bario, Fierce Fight Erupts Over $315 Million Vioxx Attorneys Fee Fund, AM. LAW. LITIG. 
DAILY (Feb. 24, 2011), available at http://www.law.com/
jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202483003077; Dionne Searcey, The Vioxx Endgame:  It’s All 
About the Fees, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (March 3, 2011 6:01 PM ET), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/03/03/the-vioxx-endgame-its-all-about-the-fees/?mod=google
_news_blog.   
  This enormous sum will come on top of the millions in fees the 
 75. Motley Rice’s Objection to the Vioxx Fee Allocation Committee’s Common Benefit 
Fee Recommendation at Parts I–II.A., In re  Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. 
La. Feb. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Motley Rice’s Objection]. 
 76. See id. 
 77. Cf. id. Parts I, II.B. 
 78. See Co-Lead Counsel’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Additional 
Discovery Pursuing Side Deals Related to the Fund Awarded by this Court’s Order of 
October 19, 2010 at 11–20, In re  Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. Feb. 
28, 2011), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/
022811becnelfiling.pdf (arguing that certain lead attorneys improperly disbursed common 
benefit funds without court approval). 
 79. Order, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 2011), 
available at http://vioxx.laed.uscourts.gov/Orders/012011.or.pdf.  The law firms and the 
recommended amounts are Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis & Miles, P.C. ($40.9 
million), Herman, Herman, Katz & Cotlar, L.L.P. ($32.5 million), and Seeger Weiss ($40.9 
million).  In addition, the law firm of Ashcraft & Gerel, LLP, which some objectors claim is 
associated with the liaison counsel, is slated to receive $9 million.  The total shared by firms 
associated with the Lead and Liaison Counsel could therefore exceed $120 million.  See 
Joint Objection of Eric Weinberg, Chris Placitella and Cohen, Placitella and Roth to the Fee 
Allocation Committee’s Jan. 20, 2010 Recommendation at 34, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. 
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firms will receive from their signed clients.  By making compensation of 
this magnitude available, judges encourage lawyers to use all possible 
means, no matter how devious, to obtain lead counsel positions. 
Although most of the objections filed in Vioxx concern the FAC’s fee 
recommendations, some suggest that incentives created by judicial control 
of common benefit fees corrupted the manner in which the lead attorneys 
conducted the MDL.  For example, the Motley Rice law firm alleges that 
the six bellwether cases its lawyers prepared for trial were “pushed aside for 
lesser cases selected by individuals who positioned themselves for a vast 
overpayment of [fees from the] common fund.”80
The proposal Professor Miller and I designed would preserve the good 
incentives that flow from contingent percentage fee arrangements.  It would 
also replace the political convention mentality that currently prevails in 
MDLs with an ordinary business model of the sort that operates and works 
well in joint ventures and law firms.  Lawyers who are good at bringing in 
business will team up with lawyers who are good at delivering legal 
services of other types, including lawyers who are good at negotiating and 
structuring mass settlements.  The cost of common benefit work will be 
shared on a pro rata basis but will not be a separate source of income for 
lead attorneys.  There will be problems, the main one being the possibility 
of kickbacks from common benefit lawyers to the lead lawyers who engage 
them.  If the problems can be addressed, the proposal will restore a 
desirable degree of order to the plaintiffs’ side of MDLs.  Instead of 
enriching themselves by unseemly means, lead attorneys who want to 
enhance their compensation will have to increase claimants’ recoveries. 
  In other words, Motley 
Rice contends that, when selecting Vioxx cases for bellwether trials, the 
lead attorneys were more concerned about fattening their lodestars than 
maximizing the value of plaintiffs’ claims.  I do not know whether this is 
true, but I can say that the allegation is plausible because the lodestar 
method, which rewards time expended, creates perverse incentives.  If lead 
lawyers were paid contingent percentage fees, they would gain by selecting 
the strongest cases for bellwether trials.  But lead attorneys are paid by the 
hour, at least in part.  Consequently, they may gain by selecting weaker 
bellwether cases in which they have invested larger amounts of 
compensable time.  Motley Rice’s complaint is plausible because judges 
base common benefit fee awards in MDLs on time expended and hourly 
rates. 
CONCLUSION 
A real need exists to stretch judicial resources by aggregating related 
claims and lawsuits.  Neither this Article nor the article I co-authored with 
Professor Miller constitutes an attack on aggregation per se.  But aggregate 
 
Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011) (asserting that “the firm that received the 
third-highest hourly rate, Ashcraft & Gerel, LLP ($1325/hr.) is in partnership with FAC 
member Russ Herman, seventh-rated at $1102/hr.”). 
 80. Motley Rice’s Objection, supra note 75, at Part II.B. 
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proceedings can be conducted in many ways, some of which trample so 
heavily on parties’ or lawyers’ rights as to be unlawful.  Judicial 
management techniques that interfere with the enforcement of substantive 
legal rights and obligations are especially concerning.  They achieve 
economies of scale by preventing the civil justice system from doing its job, 
which requires that parties represented by loyal advocates be able to try 
cases at reasonable cost and with reasonable dispatch. 
Professor Milton Handler identified this problem in a famous article 
published many years ago.  He argued that class action settlements were 
“legalized blackmail” because judges enmeshed defendants in endless and 
expensive litigation, effectively preventing them from ever vindicating 
themselves at trial.81  Defendants could either settle or bear high litigation 
costs indefinitely.  Judge William G. Young recently made the analogous 
point with respect to plaintiffs caught up in MDLs, pointing out that that 
“[o]nce trial is no longer a realistic alternative, . . . [settlement] bargaining 
focuses . . . on ability to pay, the economic consequences of the litigation, 
and the terms of the minimum payout necessary to extinguish the plaintiff’s 
claims.”82
The American civil justice system is miraculous.  Because of it, our 
nation is uniquely devoted to the rule of law and the vindication of legal 
claims.  But we must understand the miracle, if we are to preserve it.  
Structurally, the civil justice system works because parties represented by 
loyal advocates are able to try cases in front of judges and juries that are 
honest, independent, and neutral.  MDL practices that saddle plaintiffs with 
conflicted attorneys, that make trials practically impossible, or that involve 
judges deeply in the management of plaintiffs’ representation, put the 
miracle at risk. 
  Due process is denied when any party, plaintiff or defendant, 
loses merits-based bargaining leverage in settlement negotiations because a 
judge is employing a procedure that prevents a case from being tried. 
 
 
 81. Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust 
Suits—The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971).  I 
describe Milton Handler’s view and other versions of the class action blackmail thesis in 
Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”:  Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1357 (2003). 
 82. DeLaventura v. Columbia Acorn Trust, 417 F. Supp. 2d 147, 155 (D. Mass. 2006). 
